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Recent blogs published by the CBS have tended toward a passive 
tone of reflection, seeking to objectively mitigate the emotive political 
and cultural crises caused by Brexit. Hopes for 2019 marking a more 
conciliatory tone have fallen short in under ten days, despite calls for 
a new period of Brexit ‘Zen’ on these very pages. 
Since 2016, one underlying rhetoric often forgotten in the melee that 
is the Brexit debate has been the need for us to ‘come together’ and 
‘move on’ in one direction as one country. I won’t waste time 
unpicking the inherent contradiction in calls to ‘move on together’ 
when the destination remains ambiguous. Nor will I discuss how many 
insurgent’s dissent may have been mitigated had they shown this 
same commitment to collaboration over the past 20 years. Instead, it 
seems pertinent to reflect on just how any state of ‘zen’ or 
reconciliation can be expected in such a divisive environment. 
Often here the sanctity of democratic process is raised, the singularity 
and infallibility of any result sacrosanct. Comparing the current 
situation to, say, voting in a general election is a huge mistake. If an 
election delivers a government you disagree or become disillusioned 
with, we collectively have five years to reconvene a response. Brexit 
however marks a line in the sand from which there is little chance of 
return. Resistance is of course to be expected. 
More relevant here is how any expectations of reconciliation can 
realistically be posed as things stand. Because whilst political and 
media hyperbole seek to maintain the clear divide between Leavers 
and Remainers, these reductions belie a more complex level of social, 
political and cultural fragmentation secreting an insidious resin which 
will bind us for decades. 
Let’s focus first on the economic argument. Whilst unswerving in my 
desire to remain in the EU, I don’t buy into some economists’ worst-
case scenarios of 30% falls in house values, mass emigration of 
whole industries, and the immediate need for stockpiling. As an 
economic geographer by trade, the ongoing quasi-religious status of 
the economist – who starts analysis with trade rather than place – is I 
will admit hugely irritating. Almost universal amongst economists is an 
opinion Brexit will negatively impact the economy, one of the founding 
principles here a place-linked ‘gravity’ effect. The almost sole 
dissenter is Brexiteers go-to expert, Patrick Minford. Even Minford’s 
analysis will make unwelcome reading for many leave voters, 
specifically those in the ‘places that don’t matter’[1], predicting the 
erosion of manufacturing and increased wage polarisation between 
skilled and unskilled workers[2]. Add to this expected effects of 
automation on low skilled, easily immitable occupations, and the 
divisions and scope for counter-insurgency within the Leaver camp 
become explicit. 
These divisions are similarly notable in the political sphere. 
Fragmentation within the two major parties in the UK (or should that 
be England – this is after all an English question) is nothing new. The 
scale of this fragmentation does fundamentally threaten the political 
landscape. Even without a largescale reconfiguration of parties, pitting 
a Soubry and Umunna-led En Marche against the polar-radicals of 
Corbyn and Rees-Mogg, the relatively unfluctuating nature of current 
polls might indicate that for the foreseeable future coalition or minority 
government is the new normal. This of course will do little to validate 
the efficiency of government. 
Perhaps most significant however will be the enduring cultural divide 
the Brexit debacle represents. Despite the growing campaign for a 
2nd referendum, this is not a scenario I see as capable of any clarity on 
the situation. This is not because allowing a final say on the issue is 
not democratic; it is fundamentally fair and appropriate to ask the 
question. But the figurative box is open. It illustrates a phenomenon 
too many are too obtuse to realise. 
This geo-political tangent outlines the real differentiation between 
Leavers and Remainers; their ability to see the position of the nation-
state in a shrinking world and therefore the role and necessity of 
supra-national governance. The resurgence of Nationalism across the 
globe is not indicative of an ideology reborn, but represents the 
strangled death knell of a belief bound singularly into the eroding 
notion of the nation-state. These concepts and borders embedded in 
the consciousness of those aged over 40 are systematically dissolving 
in the minds of subsequent generations, partially through population 
mobility but also through communication advancements. Key value 
sets are instead shaped by specific aesthetic ideals defined on more 
localised notions of place. Thus, the value set of youthful, Europhile 
populations in London, Bristol, Manchester and Brighton have more in 
common with those of Paris, Amsterdam and Berlin than their 
neighbours in Thurrock, Gloucester, Burnley or Worthing. 
We thus reach the unavoidable question; where does this leave us? In 
such an intractable position, resolution is difficult. We can re-run the 
vote forever and will never reach a clear mandate moving more than 
55% in favour either way. Maybe conceding to an unsatisfactory 
halfway house is therefore justifiable, united in scorn of unconvincing 
compromise. Alternatively, we restructure the foundations of British 
society along the lines of China Mieville’s “The City and the City”; 
existing in the same space but different states where Remainers 
retain EU privileges as Leavers gain their much-vaunted sovereignty. 
From my perspective, the divisive nature of the referendum is a long 
way from over. As we wind down a hundred-year period which has 
reduced the British Empire from almost a quarter of the world’s 
population to a relatively modest island, maybe the question to ask is 
not that of the UK’s future in the EU. It is of the future of the UK itself. 
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